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Is support for Donald Trump correlated with hate? This state-analysis examines the 
relationship between Donald Trump’s White supremacist rhetoric and rates of racially-motivated 
hate crimes. This study argues that Trump’s rhetoric was connected to his votes and that those 
who voted for him agree with and adopted this rhetoric. Further, this study hypothesizes that the 
increase in support for White Supremacist rhetoric leads to an increase of racially-motivated hate 
crimes. Using the 2016 U.S. Presidential election results, the FBI’s 2017 Annual Report of Hate 
Crime Statistics, and the 2017 American Community Survey (N = 50), this study proposes that 
the higher a state’s percentage of votes for Trump in 2016, the higher a state’s rate of racially 
motivated hate crimes per capita. The results of the data support the opposite—that is, higher 
levels of support for Trump correlate to lower levels of hate crime rates. This study ends by 
discussing the effects of reporting and underreporting on these data, and proposes that what this 
study found is not that Trump states have less racially-motivated hate crimes, but rather that 
Trump states are underreporting hate crimes overall.  
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The United States claims to strongly value freedom for all and to be the land of 
opportunity. Our 1st Amendment grants us freedom of speech, allowing us to express our beliefs 
freely and wholly. As a result, we have a message in our culture stating that we need to respect 
everyone’s opinions, no matter the content of said opinions, as it is a fundamental right. But what 
if one’s belief is that Whites are superior to all beings and that all other races should be 
subordinated or even eradicated? What if the idea is that homosexuality ought to be punishable 
by death? What if one’s ideology is completely filled with hate for a group? Should we blindly 
respect their opinion for the sake of freedom? Is that truly freedom for all? 
Since the campaign and election of Donald Trump, we have seen an increase in bigoted 
rhetoric and have come to see it as a normalized phenomenon. As a result, we have seen an 
increase in racial threat and racial animosity among his supporters, which studies show are 
strongly correlated to hate crimes (Cunningham 2018; Durso and Jacobs 2013; Klein and Allison 
2018; Lyons 2008; McVeigh and Cunningham 2012; Perry and Blazak 2009; Powers and Socia 
2019; Sweeny and Perliger 2018). Trump and his rhetoric are not so powerful that he converted 
open-minded and tolerant people into right-wing extremists—hate will not go away when 
Trump’s presidency ends. Further, we cannot credit Trump for the invention of White 
Supremacy. Rather, Trump and his rhetoric have helped cultivate and develop this racial threat 
and animosity. His White supremacist rhetoric has renormalized the phenomena of blatant 
racism in the U.S. The racial threat and animosity that he brought about in people and 
normalized will prevail long after he leaves office. These phenomena should not be brushed off 
as mere differences of opinion, though, as this level of hate and fear leads to severe 
consequences (quite literally). I want to study the link between Trump and hate in the U.S. in 
order to show the reality of the tangible harm that words and ideologies can cause. 
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Trump and his rhetoric have caused an increase of people feeling comfortable being open 
about their hate. Trump inspires people like him to “tell it like it really is,” therefore spreading 
and normalizing white supremacist and bigoted thought. I want to analyze how this relates to the 
rate of racially-motivated hate crimes in the U.S. Has the U.S. seen an increase in hate crimes 
since Trump started campaigning? If so, can this trend be generalized towards the nation, or does 
it vary by state? I hypothesize that the greater the percentage of votes a state had for Trump in 
the 2016 election, the greater the rate of racially-motivated hate crimes (RMHCs) per capita in a 
state. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study utilizes Group Threat Theory. Specifically, this study focuses on a subset of 
this theory, namely Racial Group Threat Theory, or simply, Racial Threat. Group Threat arises 
when the population of a minority group increases, and the dominant group feels their social 
position is threatened. More specifically, Racial Threat arises when the population of people of 
color (POC) increases, and as a result, White people feel as though their group position is 
threatened (Blumer 1958). With this theory in mind, I argue that Trump’s widespread White 
Supremacist rhetoric inspired a rise in Racial Threat among his supporters and among White 
America. I hypothesize that this rise in Racial Threat has led to a correlation between support for 
Trump and racially-motivated hate crimes in the U.S. since the beginning of his campaign in 
2015.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Has the increase in normalized White Supremacist rhetoric since the Trump campaign 
caused an increase in RMHCs in the U.S.? White supremacy and bigotry are not new 
phenomena, and hate crimes are not a recent development—the two have a long history. 
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Literature shows that hate crimes and bigotry are inextricably linked. Even when there is no pre-
meditation for hate crimes, and when the crime is completely spontaneous, who the offender 
decides to kill is subject to their visible identities being what makes them a target (Messner, 
McHugh, and Felson 2004; Sweeney and Perliger 2018). In the case of racially-motivated hate 
crimes, White supremacy is integral to the motivation behind hate crimes. White supremacy and 
bigotry lead to racial threat and racial animosity, which can last decades. Studies have shown 
that regions with a history of White Supremacy, for example, regions with historically high KKK 
activity, are still affected by this activity today (McVeigh and Cunningham 2012). There are 
several themes rooted in history and intergroup relations that help us better understand hate 
crimes, and especially hate crimes as they occur in the modern context. 
The Adversary Effect, Racial Animosity, and Racial Threat 
The adversary effect, racial animosity, and racial threat are three phenomena that are very 
difficult to separate, and are further complicated by intergroup racial dynamics. The adversary 
effect is the phenomenon of a perpetrator of any form of crime using more severe or fatal 
techniques when attacking a victim based on how dangerous they perceive their victim to be. In 
other words, there is a positive relationship between the perceived danger or threat of the victim 
and the severity of the attack (Powers and Socia 2019). This effect is often found in incidents of 
hate crime, and largely affects the severity of attacks against People of Color (POC). Anti-Black 
hate groups promote the stereotype that Blacks are violent and criminals, and do so in order to 
recruit, and to establish as well as maintain group cohesion (Durso and Jacobs 2013). This, along 
with the way in which POC are portrayed in the media, instills an implicit bias in most people 
that POC are dangerous, and as a result, POC are more subject to being victims of severe hate 
crimes due to the adversary effect (Powers and Socia 2019). 
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While the adversary effect often impacts the severity of hate crimes, racial animosity and 
racial threat are often the primary motivators of hate crimes being perpetrated in the first place. 
Racial threat is a common phenomenon among Whites in the U.S.; Racial threat is the perceived 
occurrence of a large shift in power dynamics in society. Whites often feel as though the U.S. is 
being “taken over” by POC and immigrants, and that soon Whites will be subordinated. As a 
result, they feel threatened and feel the need to eliminate said threat. RMHCs are most likely to 
be committed by White offenders and are most likely to be targeted against racial minorities 
(Klein and Allison 2018). Further, while Whites account for the highest number of self-reported 
bias-crime victimizations, or while Whites most often claim to have been victims of a hate crime 
or hate incident, Blacks and Hispanics are at a higher risk for being victims of more violent 
attacks and racially motivated crimes perpetrated by Whites (Messner et al. 2004; Tessler et al. 
2018).  
While many hypothesize and hope that living in diverse areas would lead to increased 
understanding between groups due to exposure, studies show that diversification can lead to 
increased hostility and racial threat among Whites against POC (Craig and Richeson 2014; 
Lyons 2008; Perry and Blazak 2009; Piatkowska, Messner, and Hövermann 2019). This general 
animosity and threat is what stimulates the reactionary responses of perpetrators of RMHCs 
(McDevitt, Levin, and Bennet 2002); Whites who perceive a wave of minorities moving into 
White neighborhoods as a threat do so because they see it as having their territory being invaded 
and trespassed upon and their segregated boundaries crossed, thereby warranting a response 
(McDevitt et al. 2002; Perry and Blazak 2009). Whites can even feel racial threat if someone in 
their family marries someone who is Black, thereby leading to an increase in hate crimes 
(Piatkowska et al. 2019). Spontaneous hate crimes are more likely to happen when one’s 
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environment diversifies abruptly; the crimes are hyper-reactionary (McDevitt et al. 2002; 
Sweeney and Perliger 2018). Contrary to the stereotype, hate crimes are not solely perpetrated by 
hate groups who have carefully planned their attack, but also by random people who are not 
affiliated with any specific hate group and spontaneously attack others. 
An important and often overlooked note is that while racial animosity can cause racially 
motivated incidents (not necessarily hate crimes), the causal relationship can also be reversed. It 
is not just the extreme cases of hate groups that cause this racial animosity and intergroup 
hostility. Everyday manifestations of power dynamics via racially-motivated incidents can affect 
the way groups interact with each other, thereby affecting the attitudes towards each other (Blee 
2007). Once this animosity has been established, the possibility of more serious incidents of 
racially motivated hate crimes increases. 
The Subtlety of Hate 
When we hear the word hate crime, we often picture the lynching of a Black man, the 
excessively vulgar stabbing of a POC, or some other extreme action taken against another 
person. While these are absolutely examples of hate crimes and forms of hate crimes that still 
occur in the U.S. today, hate crimes are often not as extreme as they once were. Hate in the U.S. 
appears to have gone away, but it simply has transformed. This misconception has caused many 
issues in the world of hate crimes and attaining justice for victims. Further, it has made it more 
difficult to parse out what constitutes hate in the first place.  
A common phenomenon in the U.S. is hate speech. Hate speech in the modern context is 
not as explicit as it was in the 1960s. Hate speech has not gone away, but has rather become 
subtler and more hidden, and because of its lack of explicitness, is not understood to be hate 
speech. Yet, it is this rhetoric that is found on areas of the internet and in the media that help 
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mobilize hate groups and form identity (Alvarez-Benjumea and Winter 2018; Josey 2010). 
Further, uncensored hate speech in online settings allows for people to “feed off of” each other 
and make them more likely to contribute to hate speech (Alvarez-Benjumea and Winter 2018; 
Blee and Creasap 2010). It is argued that Donald Trump and his rhetoric are highly correlated to 
the rise of hate groups and hate speech. For example, Trump’s anti-muslim rhetoric and travel 
ban appear to be connected with a rise of anti-muslim hate groups; approximately 30 groups 
existed in 2015, and the number shot up to 101 in 2016. (Cunningham 2018). We also saw this 
during the Obama era. The increase in hostile and racially-charged political rhetoric during the 
Obama era lead to perceived threat among right-wingers, suggesting an increase in hate crimes 
and hate groups (Hicks and Hicks 2014). This phenomenon has a similar relationship in the 
opposite direction; an increase in Black populations and violent (racially-motivated crime rates) 
leads to an increase in Republican representation in state legislatures (Jacobs and Tope 2008). In 
conjunction, these two relationships create a cycle; an increase in Black population and hate 
crimes leads to an increase in Republican representation, while an increase in right-wing rhetoric 
and voiced racial threat via an increase in Republican representation leads to an increase in hate 
crimes and groups. 
Despite the compelling evidence showing a relationship between normalized racially 
charged speech and hate groups, we still call this hate speech “racially-charged” rather than 
hateful. Because the severity of hate speech and hate crimes in the U.S. was once hyper-visible 
and explicit, many wrongfully are under the impression that this hate is no longer an issue. Not 
only does this effect the way we perceive hate speech, but it also affects how seriously various 
hate crimes are taken. The more severe incidents are more likely to enter the criminal justice 
system, while the subtler versions are underreported and rarely make it to trial. I argue that rather 
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than there being a lack of evidence, there is a lack of “severe enough” evidence, leading to 
underreporting of hate crimes and an overall feel of a lack of hate in the U.S.  
Underreporting 
Much of the issue with gathering hate crime statistics is a result of the flimsy definition of 
what ought to be categorized as a hate crime in the U.S. (Blee 2005; Cronan et al. 2007; Dixon 
and Ray 2007; Nolan et al. 2015). This is only exacerbated by the FBI and federal government 
“suggesting” a hate crime definition rather than enforcing one. The discrepancy between the 
federal definition of hate crime and the state level definition causes further issues and 
inconsistencies of levels of reporting between states and even within states (Cronin et al. 2007; 
Nolan et al. 2015). This lack of rigor allows room for subjectivity, affecting interpretation of 
crimes as a whole as well as the specific evidence within each crime, and also allows room for 
ideology to play a part.  
A large cause of the problem with reporting and further police action is caused by the 
difficulty of obtaining evidence of bias motivation (Lantz, Gladfelter, and Ruback 2019; Nolan 
et al. 2004). With no universalized definition of what constitutes a hate crime, there is no 
systematized way of analyzing pieces of evidence. Further, motive for (hate) crimes is more 
difficult to establish or argue for in hate crimes due to the allowed freedom to define hate crimes.  
Because of the freedom allowed in defining hate crimes, there is much room left for 
ideology. Counties with high rates of Republican voting are less likely to report hate crimes than 
those with higher levels of Democratic voting (McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). 
Specifically, for Republican districts and areas, there tends to be an adoption of a “color-blind” 
approach to interpreting the motivation behind a crime and whether or not it “counts” as a hate 
crime. Conservatism and fundamentalism cause law enforcement districts to be less likely to 
Hiding Hate  Garcia  
1 For further information on how the data was collected, go to https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/resource-
pages/about-hate-crime. 
8
incriminate Whites who commit crimes against racial minorities (Blee 2005; King 2008; 
McVeigh et al. 2003).  
To sum up, literature has shown the interconnectedness of racially-motivated hate crimes 
and White supremacist ideology. This ideology affects not only the motivation behind hate 
crimes, but also the rates at which these crimes are reported and the methods used to report them. 
The literature shows that hate does not have to be particularly extreme or vulgar in order to 
inspire hate in others. Simply put, hate is hate. Today, hate has become subtler and less blatant, 
which often gives the false impression that hate among groups is no longer an issue. This subtler 
version of hate is no less dangerous than the more obvious forms, though, as the literature 
suggests this hate is just as capable of increasing racial threat and animosity as the more blatant 
forms of hate. This increase in racial threat, regardless of its source, poses the risk of increased 
hate crimes that are committed, as it is one of the primary motivations behind racially-motivated 
hate crimes. 
METHODS 
In order to test the literature and my hypotheses, I will be using three data sets: the FBI’s 
Annual Reports of Hate Crime Statistics (HCS) for 2017; the U.S. Census Bureau’s American 
Community Survey (ACS) from 2017; and the 2016 Presidential Election results. For each data 
set, my unit of analysis will be U.S. states. The HCS’s reports provide the numbers of bias-
motivated crimes in the nation, with subsets that include the specific motivation (anti-Black, 
anti-gay, etc.), state, race of offender, and more. The rate of hate crimes reported in the HCS 
wholly relies on the amount that each states police agencies report (or underreport), so the data is 
imperfect. For 2017, the HCS had a response rate of 94 percent.1 The state of Hawaii did not 
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provide a report for hate crimes in 2017, so the state of Hawaii has been excluded from this 
study. For the purposes of this study, I am only going to be looking at the rate of RMHCs.  
The ACS is an annual survey sent to about 3.5 million randomly selected households in 
the U.S. The ACS allows the U.S. Census Bureau to gather data about the nation and its people 
during years when the decennial Census is not being sent out. This data set includes populations  
in states and in the nation, as well as subsets of the population that show the racial distribution of 
each state. The ACS received a 92 percent response rate.2 I will also be using the number of 
votes for Trump in the 2016 election results to gauge the level of Trump support by state. The 
sample includes everyone who voted in the 2016 presidential election.  
For my dependent variable, I want to study the rate of hate crimes in every state. To do 
so, I will use the HCS to see the number of RMHCs reported in each state. I will divide this 
number by the total population of each state provided by the ACS’s data in order to get the rate 
of RMHCs in each state. Finally, I will multiply this number by 1,000 in order to attain the rate 
of RMHCs per capita in a given state.   
For my independent variable, I want to gauge each state’s level of support for Donald 
Trump in order to gauge the level of White supremacy and racial animosity. I decided to use the 
2016 Presidential Election results for the popular vote to look at the percentage of votes for 
Trump in each state. I did not include the electoral college votes as the electoral college is an 
extremely flawed system that does not accurately represent the beliefs of voters. However, using 
the popular vote is still an imperfect measure of support, as many who voted for Trump regret 
doing so and do not continue to support him. Further, not everyone voted in the election, so there 
could be more Trump supporters than the data shows. Nonetheless, I decided to use this data in 
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order to rid of as much bias among the data as possible. Using the election results, I was 
provided the percentage of popular votes for Trump within each state. 
For my control variable, I will be using the ACS. Many Trump supporting states are 
mostly made up of White people. As a result, Trump supporting states may have fewer racially-
motivated hate crimes simply because there are not enough racial minorities to be targeted within 
the state. As a result, I will be controlling for the racial distribution within each state. To do so, I 
will use the percentage of Whites within each state to indicate how racially diverse (or not) a 
state is.  
FINDINGS 
For my independent variable, percentage of votes for Trump, Figure 1 shows that about 
33 percent of states had 40 to 49.99 percent votes for Trump in the 2016 election. The smallest 
percentage of votes for Trump was in Washington D.C., with 4.1 percent votes for Trump, and 
the largest percentage of votes was in Wyoming, with 70.10 percent votes for Trump. Table 1 
shows that the average percentage of votes for Trump in a state was 49.40 percent, with a 
standard deviation of 11.66 percent, indicating that two-thirds of states had between 38 and 61 
percent of votes for Trump. 
For my dependent variable, hate crimes per capita in each state, the numbers shown in 
Table 1 and Figure 2 represent the number of hate crimes that occur for every 1000 people in the 
state. Figure 2 shows that the largest percentage of rate of hate crimes per capita is 0-0.49. This 
means that about 37 percent of states have 0-0.49 hate crimes per every 1000 people. Table 1 
shows that the average rate of hate crimes per capita is 1.56. There is a standard deviation of 
2.36, indicating that two-thirds of states have hate crime rates per capita ranging from 0 to 3.92. 
Figure 2 shows that there is a strong left-skew in the rate of hate crimes.  
Hiding Hate  Garcia  
 
11
For my control variable, percentage of Whites per state, Figure 3 shows a right skew, 
indicating that more states have larger percentages of Whites. The largest percentage of Whites 
in state fall between 80 percent and 89 percent.  Table 1 shows that the average percentage of 
Whites in state is 76.75, with a standard deviation of 11.71. This indicates that two-thirds of 
states have between 65 and 88 percentages of Whites.  
Table 2 shows a statistically significant, moderate to strong negative correlation (r =  
-.560) between the percentage of votes for Trump and the hate crime rate per capita. This means 
that as a state’s percentage of votes for Trump in the 2016 election increases, the state’s hate 
crime rate per capita decreases. Table 2 also shows a statistically significant, weak to moderate 
negative correlation (r = -.267) between the percentage of Whites in a state and the hate crime 
rate per capita. This indicates that as a state’s percentage of Whites increases, the hate crime rate 
per capita decreases. Finally, Table 2 shows a statistically significant positive moderate 
correlation (r = .444) between percentage of votes for Trump and a state’s percentage of Whites. 
This means that as a state’s percentage of Whites increases, a state’s percentage of votes for 
Trump in 2016 increases. 
As indicated in Table 3, the R2 is .314, indicating that 31 percent of the variance in hate 
crime rates per capita can be explained by a state’s percentage of votes for Trump and a state’s 
percentage of Whites. The F value in Table 3 shows that the regression equation is significant at 
the .001 level. Additionally, votes for Trump was significant at the .001 level, indicating that 
there is a .01 percent chance that the results would have occurred by chance alone. While the 
percentage of the state that is White was statistically significant at the bivariate level, it is no 
longer statistically significant in the regression equation. Table 3 indicates an unstandardized 
coefficient, b, of -0.111 for votes for Trump, meaning that for every one percent increase in a 
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state’s percentage of votes for Trump, the state’s hate crime rate per capita decreases by 0.111. 
The standardized coefficient, ß, for votes for Trump was -.550. Because a state’s percentage of 
Whites was not significant, a state’s percentage of votes for Trump is the only predictor of a 
state’s hate crime rate per capita in this regression equation. 
In sum, the results of the data do not support my hypothesis. Instead, the data supports 
the opposite of my hypothesis. Rather than an increase in votes for Trump causing an increase in 
hate crime rates per capita, an increase in votes causes a decrease in hate crime rates per capita. 
DISCUSSION 
As shown, the data did not support my hypothesis. Rather, the results support the 
opposite of my hypothesis, showing that higher levels of Trump support in a state lead to lower 
levels of hate crimes in that state. Further, Group Threat Theory, or specifically Racial Threat, 
was not supported by the results of this study, as the rise in racial threat brought about by Trump 
did not lead to increased racially-motivated hate crime rates in Trump-supporting states, but 
rather led to decreased rates. Further, the racial composition of a state was not statistically 
significant, therefore providing further lack of support for Racial Group Threat Theory. 
However, rather than going against all of the literature that cites a correlation between White 
supremacy and hate crimes, this study may still support the literature, despite my hypothesis not 
being supported. It is crucial to keep in mind the data that I am using, as the data itself may be 
the cause of why the results came out the way that they did. 
This study used the FBI’s hate crime statistics, which relies wholly on each state, and the 
police departments within each state, to report to the FBI the rates of hate crimes.  Furthermore, 
while the FBI has their own definition of hate crime, this definition is not enforced. Instead, each 
state is allowed to have their own definition of hate crime. What’s more, Arkansas, Georgia, 
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South Carolina, and Wyoming do not even have hate crime laws. All of this to say, I argue that 
what this study has shown is not that states with higher levels of Trump support are correlated 
with lower rates of hate crimes. Rather, the data shows that states with higher levels of Trump 
support are correlated with lower reported rates of hate crimes. This means that the study may 
indicate that Trump support is correlated with underreporting—strongly correlated with 
underreporting, I might emphasize.  
Because the data relies on reported rates of hate crimes, rather than the rates of hate 
crimes that can be proven to truly exist, the data may show a correlation between Trump support, 
which I argue is synonymous with White supremacy, and underreporting hate crimes. The 
literature indicates that conservative states underreport hate crimes (Blee 2005; King 2008; 
McVeigh et al. 2003; McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). Further, the literature indicates 
that conservativism and Trump’s hate speech are both correlated with increased hate, be it in the 
form of racial animosity/threat, alt-right ideology, hate speech, and more (Alvarez-Benjumea and 
Winter 2018; Blee and Creasap 2010; Cunningham 2018; Hicks and Hicks 2014; Jacobs and 
Tope 2008). Finally, the literature indicates that racial animosity/threat, hate speech, alt-right 
ideology, and more, are all correlated with the occurrence of hate crimes as well as with 
underreporting (Craig and Richeson 2014; Cunningham 2018; Durso and Jacobs 2013; Klein and 
Allison 2018; Lyons 2008; McDevitt et al. 2002; Messner et al. 2004; Perry and Blazak 2009; 
Piatkowska et al. 2019; Powers and Socia 2019; Sweeny and Perliger 2018; Tessler et al. 2018). 
The logic, then, is that conservatism and specifically Trump support lead to racial 
threat/animosity, alt-right ideology, hate speech, etc., which simultaneously may have led to 
increased hate crimes in states as well as underreporting of these very hate crimes in Trump 
states. 
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It is also noteworthy that a state’s percentage of Whites is not a significant factor in hate 
crime rates. The logic behind this variable was that while predominately White racial 
distributions lead to increased racial animosity, there still has to be enough people of color 
around for White’s to express their hate towards or against. That is, predominately White areas 
tend to have increased levels of racism and racial animosity, and would intuitively therefore have 
increased hate crime rates. However, in order to have increased hate crime rates, for racially 
motivated hate crimes at least, the areas need to have racial minorities to target. As a result, this 
study controls for a state’s distribution of Whites in order to ensure that the low hate crime rates 
were not deceptive. However, a state’s percentage of Whites was not statistically significant, 
while a state’s support for Trump was. This indicates that there is something unique about 
supporting Donald Trump that leads to underreporting of hate crimes. Again, the logic is that the 
reasoning behind underreporting hate crimes is that there is increased levels of racial animosity 
and hate. So, one can argue that there is something unique about Trump and state’s that have 
strong support for him that is connected to increased hate, and increased underreporting—It is 
not just White people being racist. 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to answer whether or not an increase in White supremacist rhetoric 
since Trump’s campaign and presidential term led to an increase in racial threat, thereby leading 
to increased rates of racially-motivated hate crimes. Given the confines of this study, however, I 
tested whether or not Trump support was correlated with higher rates of racially-motivated hate 
crimes. To do so, this study performed a state analysis with the operationalization of Trump 
support as a state’s percentage of votes for Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Using Racial 
Group Threat to frame the study, the hypothesis was that as a state’s percentage of votes for 
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Trump increases, a state’s rate of racially-motivated hate crimes per capita increases. The 
regression analysis supported the opposite of this hypothesis, indicating that as a state’s 
percentage of votes for Trump increases, the states hate crime rate per capita decreases. Further, 
the results did not support Racial Group Threat, as the racial composition of a state was 
insignificant, and the rise in racial threat brought about by Trump was correlated with decreased 
hate crime rates, providing evidence against Racial Group Threat theory. However, connecting 
the results to the literature, this study argues that the data instead supports that as Trump support 
increases, underreporting of hate crimes increases. 
A limitation of this study is the lack of control variables that were used. While the data 
indicates a significant and negative relationship between Trump support and hate crime rates per 
capita, this correlation could potentially be explained by other factors that were unable to be held 
constant. For example, controlling for conservatism could help distinguish between the racial 
threat that exists among conservatives and the racial threat that exists within Trump support 
specifically. Future studies should use county-level data in order to have more freedom to use 
multiple control variables. Future studies should also distinguish between pre-Trump and post-
Trump hate crime rates by conducting a time analysis; this would allow for comparing rates 
before and after his campaign started as well as to track the trend of hate crime rates throughout 
the Trump-era. Using county-level data for this time analysis would allow for greater freedom in 
the use of variables and therefore for a more holistic regression analysis. 
Another limitation is the data used for hate crimes in this study; the FBI’s annual reports 
of hate crime statistics do not enforce a definition upon states and therefore states have room to 
report hate crimes with their own definition and criteria. Firstly, not enforcing a hate crime 
definition among states means each state is reporting crimes with different criteria, which does 
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not allow for one to compare the hate crime rates between states. To put it colloquially, the data 
does not allow us to compare apples to apples, but rather to compare apples to oranges to 
bananas and so on. Secondly, not enforcing a definition of hate crime upon states allows each 
state to allow ideology to influence the definition chosen, thereby allowing room for bias. While 
the data itself could explain the outcome of the results, there is no way to support that the data is 
biased and inaccurate. As a result, future studies should find an unbiased and soundly collected 
data set in order to answer the question of whether or not Trump support is correlated with less 
racial violence, or rather with underreporting. We need to answer whether or not we are giving 
White supremacists and bigots the power to hide their racism and racial violence by not 
enforcing a federal definition of hate crime and thereby allowing room for underreporting.  
While enforcing a federal definition of hate crime is an imperfect solution, it is 
nonetheless an important starting point to addressing the issue of underreporting. Enforcing a 
definition of hate crime upon states does not necessarily mean that states will truly adopt the 
definition. There will always be room for interpretation of definitions and some level of 
subjectivity (i.e. in one person’s opinion the motive was clearly racist, to another the motive had 
nothing to do with race). Enforcing a definition does not guarantee accurate reporting; it simply 
means that it will be more difficult to underreport and get away with it. However, as stated, 
enforcing a federal definition is a crucial first step, as making the ability to underreport more 
difficult, even if it is only slightly more difficult, is a step in the right direction. 
The results of the study leave us in a difficult state. One could accept the results of the 
data at face value and accept that there is evidence for Trump support being correlated to lower 
hate crime rates. However, there is a seemingly endless amount of literature and non-academic 
sources that would lead one to believe that the opposite is the case Craig and Richeson 2014; 
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Cunningham 2018; Durso and Jacobs 2013; Klein and Allison 2018; Lyons 2008; McDevitt et al. 
2002; Messner et al. 2004; Perry and Blazak 2009; Piatkowska et al. 2019; Powers and Socia 
2019; Sweeny and Perliger 2018; Tessler et al. 2018). As a result, it is imperative that the FBI 
enforces their definition of hate crimes. Even if the federal definition is an imperfect one, it could 
at least help us understand how each state’s hate crime rates compare to other state’s when the 
same method of data collection is used. Further, the federal definition can help make the issue of 
underreporting more difficult to accomplish. Otherwise, we as a country are allowing states the 
opportunity to hide their racism, to hide the racial injustice that is so pervasive throughout the 
U.S. Allowing each state to decide their own definition of hate crime allows states to let ideology 
influence the perceived importance of and care put into collecting these data.  
It is a harsh reality that racial inequality is not an important issue to many Americans—
racial injustice simply does not matter to many. To some, there is a motivation to maintain racial 
inequality. Those who desire to maintain inequality could be the very people who are reporting 
the statistics to the FBI, thereby leaving everyone under the impression that the racial climate is 
peaceful and that hate is the exception, rather than the norm. There is a motivation to hide racism 
in the U.S. and to support the claim that those who argue racial inequality exists are delusional. 
To let states determine their own definition of hate crimes is to enable states to hide and ignore 
the deaths of POC in the U.S. To let states determine their own definition of hate crimes is to 
enable hiding racial inequality in the U.S. and enable the silencing of those who try and address 
racial inequality in the U.S. People of color are dying. So long as we do not address the issue of 
underreporting, we are letting them. 
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Variables (N = 50) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Percent of Votes for Trump 49.40 11.658 
Number of Hate Crimes Per Capita 1.56 2.356 
Percent of Whites 76.75 11.710 
 
 
Figure 1. Bar Chart of Percentage of Votes for Trump 




Figure 2. Bar Chart of Hate Crimes per Capita 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of Percentage of Whites 
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Table 2. Correlations (r) Between Hate Crime Rate per Capita and Two Other 
Variables (listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N = 50) 
Variable 
Percentage of  
Votes for Trump 
Percentage of 
Whites in State 




Votes for Trump 
  .444** 
*p < .10, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 3. Regression of Hate Crime Per Capita on All Variables 
Variable     b ß 
Percent Votes for Trump -.111 -.550* 
Percent Whites in State -.005 -.023 
Constant 7.402  
R2 = .314; F(2,47) = 10.753, p < .001 
*p < .001 
 
